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Abstract
This paper explores a two-country model of capital accumulation with country-specific
production externalities. The main concern of our discussion is to investigate equilibrium
determinacy (aggregate stability) conditions in a financially integrated world economy.
We show that the well-established equilibrium determinacy conditions for the case of
small-open economy are still valid if heterogeneity between two countries is small enough.
As the technological difference between the countries increases, the equilibrium determi-
nacy conditions may diverge from those for the small country setting.
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1 Introduction
Does financial integration enhance economic volatility? With regard to this question, the
equilibrium business cycle theory based on indeterminacy and sunspots has claimed that
economic fluctuations caused by extrinsic uncertainty tend to be more prominent in financially
open economies than in closed economies. Weder (2001), for example, inspects a small-open
economy version of the two-sector model studied by Benhabib and Farmer (1996) and shows
that the model needs a lower degree of external increasing returns to yield indeterminacy of
equilibrium than the closed-economy counterpart. In a similar vain, Aguiar-Conraria, and
Wen (2005), Lahiri (2001) and Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004) demonstrate that perfect
capital mobility may enhance the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy for small-open
economies.1 The main reason for this results is that in the small-open economies with capital
mobility the interest rate is fixed in the world financial market, so that consumption behaves
as if the utility function were linear. Since a high elasticity of intertemporal substitutability
in consumption generally serves as a source of indeterminacy, a small-open economy tends to
be more volatile than a closed economy with the same technologies and preferences.
In this paper we explore whether volatility of small-open economies emphasized in the
existing studies may hold in the world economy model as well. We construct a two-country
model with commodity trade and financial interactions. Our main concern is to compare the
indeterminacy conditions for the small-open economy with those for the world economy con-
sisting of large countries. Since the world economy is a closed economy with heterogeneous
agents (countries), the present paper may be considered a study on the relationship between
heterogeneity and indeterminacy.2 The analytical framework of this paper is a two-goods,
two-country model of capital accumulation in which there are sector as well as country-specific
production externalities. Following many of the foregoing studies, we assume that technology
of each production sector satisfies social constant returns to scale, while the private technol-
1Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004) study two-sector dependent economy models with sector-specific exter-
nalities in which investment goods are not traded. Lahiri (2001) examines a endogenously growing small-open
economy with capital mobility.
2 In a different context, Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2005) also consider the relation between heterogene-
ity of agents and equilibrium indeterminacy in a closed economy model of economic growth with production
externalities.
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ogy exhibits decreasing returns. Given this setting, the small-open economy yields a clear
conclusion about aggregate stability: its equilibrium path around the steady-state is locally
intermediate, if and only if the technology of investment good sector is more capital intensive
than the consumption good sector from the social perspective, but it is less capital intensive
from the private perspective. If both sectors have the same factor intensity ranking from pri-
vate as well as social perspectives, then the competitive equilibrium is uniquely determined.
We re-examine these stability/instability conditions in the context of a financially integrated
world economy.
Our main finding is that the well-known stability conditions for the small-open economy
mentioned above are still valid in the general equilibrium model of world economy, if the
fundamentals of both countries are close to each other. More specifically, if two counties
are symmetric in the sense that they share the same technology and preference structures,
the conditions for equilibrium determinacy/indeterminacy are exactly the same as those for
the case of small open economy. When each country has different total factor productivi-
ties, so that the steady-state equilibrium is not identical for each country, then the stability
conditions under which the small-open economy exhibits local indeterminacy also produce
multiple converging equilibria in the world economy model. If the two countries have differ-
ent degree of production externalities, then the equilibrium determinacy conditions for the
world economy may diverge from those established in the small-open economy. These results
demonstrate that heterogeneity of economies would be a relevant determinant of equilibrium
determinacy in a financially integrated world.
It is to be noted that the topic of this paper is closely related to a seminal contribu-
tion by Nishimura and Shimomura (2002b) who study equilibrium indeterminacy of a two-
country world economy with the same type of production technologies assumed in this paper.
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002b) utilize a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model where both
consumption and investment goods are freely traded but there is no financial transactions
between the two countries. Additionally, following the standard formulation, they assume
that the both countries have the same production technologies. In their model, there is a
continuum of steady state distribution of capital and which steady state is realized depends
on expectations of agents if the equilibrium path is indeterminate.3 In this paper we assume
3Sim and Ho (2008) point out that if one of the two countries has no production externalities in the
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that investment goods are not traded but international lending and borrowing are allowed.
As a result, the steady-state distribution of capital between two countries is uniquely deter-
mined. As mentioned above, we also consider the case in which both countries have different
production technologies and explore how the asymmetry of technologies affects the stability
conditions. The present paper, therefore, studies the equilibrium determinacy issue in the
open-macroeconomics context rather than in the traditional trade theory context.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the base model and
summarizes the main results of the foregoing studies on the case of small-open economy.
Section 3 extends the base model to the general equilibrium model of the world economy.
Section 4 examines equilibrium determinacy in the symmetric as well as in the asymmetric
steady-state equilibrium. Section 5 makes remarks on our main discussion and Section 6
concludes.
2 The Base Model
Before examining the world economy model, we construct the base model and summarize the
main findings in small-open economy models studied by Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004)
and Weder (2001). This review is useful to capture the similarity and difference between the
stability conditions for the small-country setting and the world economy model.
2.1 Households
Consider an open economy that is financially integrated with the rest of the world. The
economy produces investment and consumption goods. While consumption goods are inter-
nationally traded, the investment goods are not tradable. We assume that while the domestic
Nishimura-Shimomura model, then indeterminacy may not hold in the world economy even if the autarkic
equilibrium of the other country is indeterminate. The assumption of symmetric technology, thus, plays a
relevant role in equilibrium determinacy of the global economy. For further development of the study by
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002b), see Chiglino (2007) and Nishimura, et al. (2006 and 2008).
4 In their related studies, Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) examine equilibrium determinacy of a small-
country version of dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model. Moreover, Nishimura and Shimomura (2006) examine
the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy in a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model of a world economy in the
absence of production externalities. Indeterminacy in their model comes from the fact that intertemporal
trade between the home and foreign countries is prohibited.
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households cannot directly own the capital stocks in foreign countries, they can freely lend
to or borrow from the foreign households in the international financial market.5
There is a continuum of identical households with a unit mass. Each household inelasti-
cally supplies a unit of labor in each moment. The objective of the representative household
is to maximize a discounted sum of utility
U =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
c1−σ
1− σdt, σ > 0, ρ > 0
subject to the following constraints:
b˙ = Rb+ rk + w − c− pv, (1)
k˙ = v − δk, (2)
where c is consumption, b stock of foreign bonds, R interest rate, r real rate of return to capital
(in terms of the consumption good), k capital stock, w real wage, p price of investment good
(in terms of the consumption good), v real investment, and δ denotes the depreciation rate
of capital. The value of foreign bonds is also evaluated by the consumption goods. Condition
(2) comes from our assumption that investment goods are not internationally traded. The
optimization behavior are also subject to the initial holdings of capital and foreign bonds as
well as the non-Ponzi game condition:
lim
t→∞
b (t) exp
µ
−
Z t
0
R (s) ds
¶
= 0. (3)
The Hamiltonian function for the household’s optimization problem is given by
H =
c1−σ
1− σ + φ (Rb+ rk + w − c− pv) + q (v − δk) ,
where φ and q respectively denote implicit prices of foreign bond and capital. The necessary
conditions for an interior optimum are:
max
c
H ⇒ c−σ = φ, (4)
5Although the same assumption has been frequently used in open-macroecomic models (e.g. Turnovsky and
Sen 1995 and Chapter 7 in Turnovsky 1997), it is obviously restrictive to assume that investment goods are
not internationally traded. For example, Bems (2008) shows that about 40% of investment goods are tradables
in developed as well as developing countries. It is, however, plausible to consider that transportation costs of
capital goods are much higher than transaction costs of financial assets. We assume that costs for transporting
capital goods are prohibitively higher than international lending and borrowing.
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max
v
H ⇒ φp = q, (5)
φ˙ = φ (ρ−R) , (6)
q˙ = q (ρ+ δ)− φr, (7)
together with (1) , (2) , the transversality conditions, limt→∞ bφe−ρt = 0 and limt→∞ ke−ρq =
0, and the initial conditions on b and k.
Equation (5) yields φ˙/φ+ p˙/p = q˙/q, so that from (6) and (7) we obtain
R =
r
p
− δ + p˙
p
. (8)
That is, the optimal portfolio choice requires that the interest rate on foreign bonds, R, equals
the net rate of return to real asset, r/p− δ, plus the capital gain, p˙/p.
2.2 Production
The production functions of the investment goods (i = 1) and the consumption goods (i = 2)
are specified by
yi = Aik
ai
i l
bi
i k¯
αi−ai
i l¯
βi−bi , i = 1, 2
0 < ai, bi < 1, ai < αi, bi < βi, αi + βi = 1,
(9)
where yi is output, ki capital and li is labor input of the i-th sector. Moreover, k¯i and l¯i
denote sector-specific external effects generated by the average levels of capital and labor
employed in sector i. We assume that every firm is identical, so that in equilibrium it holds
that k¯i = ki and l¯i = li. As a consequence, the social level of production function is
yi = Aik
1−αii
i l
1−αi
i , 0 < αi < 1, i = 1, 2.
Therefore, the production technology of each sector satisfies socially constant returns to scale,
but it exhibits privately decreasing returns.6
Each production sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive so that the rate of return
to capital and the real wage rate respectively equal the private marginal productivity of
6As far as the small-country models are concerned, the Cobb-Douglas specification of production is not
necessary to obtain our main conclusion. As shown by Mino (2001), we obtain the same conclusion when the
production function is specified as
yi = f
i (ki, li)φi
?
k¯i, l¯i
?
,
where functions f i (.) and φi (.) are homogenous of degree α and 1− α, respectively.
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capital and labor. Thus, considering that k¯i = ki and l¯i = li, we obtain the following profit
maximization conditions of the firms:
r = pa1
y1
k1
= a2
y2
k2
, w = pb1
y1
l1
= b2
y2
l2
. (10)
The full-employment conditions of capital and labor are:
k1 + k2 = k, l1 + l2 = 1. (11)
From (10) we can derive the relation between factor intensity of each sector and the relative
factor price in the following manner:
ki
li
=
bi
ai
ω, i = 1, 2, (12)
where ω = w/r. Hence, the relative price p can be expressed as
p =
A2a2 (b2/a2)
α2−1 (k2/l2)
α2−1
A1a1 (b1/a1)
α1−1 (k1/l1)
α1−1 =
A2a
α2
2 b
1−α2
2
A1a
α1
1 b
1−α1
1
ωα2−α1 (13)
and the real rate of return to capital is written as
r
p
= a1A1
µ
k1
l1
¶α1−1
= A1a
α1
1 b
1−α1
1 ωα1−1 = A1r˜ (ω) , (14)
where
r˜ (ω) ≡ b1
µ
a1
b1
¶α1
ωα1−1.
The full-employment conditions in (11) yield
l1 =
k − (k2/l2)
(k1/l1)− (k2/l2)
, l2 =
(k1/l1)− k
(k1/l1)− (k2/l2)
.
Using (10) , we see that the supply functions of each production sector is written as
y1 = l1A1
³
k1
l1
´α1
= k−(a2/b2)ω∆p A1
³
a1
b1
´α1
ωα1−1 = A1
³
b2k−a2ω
b1b2∆p
´
r˜(ω)
≡ A1y1 (k,ω) ,
(15a)
y2 = l2A2
³
k2
l2
´α2
= (a1/b1)ω−k∆p A2
³
a2
b2
´α2
ωα2−1 = A1A2
³
a1ω−b1k
b1b2∆p
´
r˜(ω)p (ω)
≡ A2y2 (k,ω) ,
(15b)
where ∆p denotes the gap of factor intensities between two sectors from the private perspec-
tive:
∆p ≡
b1
a1
− b2
a2
. (16)
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The partial derivative of supply functions are given by the following:
y1k (k,ω) =
b1
b1b2∆p
r˜(ω), (17a)
y1ω (k,ω) =
1
b1b2∆p
©
(−a2)
£
ωr˜0(ω) + r(ω)
¤
+ b2kr˜
0(ω)
ª
, (17b)
y2k (k,ω) =
µ
A1
A2
p
¶µ
−b1
b1b2∆p
¶
r˜(ω), (17c)
y2ω (k,ω) =
µ
A1
A2
p
¶
r˜(ω)
ωb1b2∆p
[α1a1ω + (1− α1)b1k] . (17d)
where
r˜0(ω) = (α1 − 1)aα11 b
1−α1
1 ωα1−2 < 0,
ωrˆ0(ω) + r(ω) = α1aα11 b
1−α1
1 ωα1−1 > 0.
Using the notation given above, we can confirm that the signs of partial derivatives of
yi (k,ω) functions satisfy the following:
sign y1k (k,ω) = sign ∆p,
sign y1ω (k,ω) = − sign ∆p,
sign y2k (k,ω) = − sign ∆p,
sign y2ω (k,ω) = sign ∆p.
(18)
2.3 Dynamics of a Small-Open Economy
The dynamic equation of capital, k, is given by
k˙ = A1y
1 (k,ω)− δk. (19)
The relative factor price changes according to
ω˙
ω =
1
α2 − α1
p˙
p
=
1
∆s
[A1r˜ (ω)−R− δ] , (20)
where
∆s = α1 − α2 (21)
measures the relative factor intensity from the social perspective.
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If the home country is a small-open economy, the interest rate R is determined in the
world financial market, and hence the time discount rate ρ must equal the given R to sustain
a competitive equilibrium satisfying the non-Ponzi-game and feasibility conditions. In such a
simple situation, it is easy to see that the steady-state equilibrium is uniquely given. Let us
denote the steady-state values of k and ω by kˆ and ωˆ, respectively. Then the approximated
dynamic system linearized at the steady state is given by
⎡
⎢⎣
k˙
ω˙
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
A1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ A1y1ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
0
ωˆ
∆s
A1r˜
0 (ωˆ)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣
k − kˆ
ω − ωˆ
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
where, in view of the steady-state conditions, it holds that
A1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ = 1
∆pa1
A1r˜ (ω)− δ =
ρ+ δ
a1∆p
− δ
=
a1ρ+ [a2 (1− b1) + b2a1]δ
∆p
.
The above relation means that
sign
h
A1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ
i
= sign ∆p. (22)
Inspecting the coefficient matrix of the linearized system given above, we see that the steady
state satisfies saddle-point stability if and only if
∆p∆s > 0.
If ∆p < 0 and ∆s > 0, then the trace of the coefficient matrix has a negative value, while
its determinant is positive, implying that the steady state is a sink.7 Thus the steady state
equilibrium of an small-open economy exhibits local indeterminacy if and only if
∆p < 0 and ∆s > 0.
Consequently, the aggregate stability of the small-open economy may be summarized as the
following proposition:8
7Conversely, if ∆s < 0 and ∆p > 0, the steady-state equilibrium is totally unstable.
8See Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004) and Weder (2001) for the details. See also Lahiri (2001), Yong and
Meng (2004) and Zhang (2008) for further discussions on equilibrium determinacy in small-open economies.
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Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium of a small-open economy is locally indetermi-
nate, if and only if the capital good sector’s technology is more capital intensive than that of
the consumption good sector from the social perspective, but it is less capital intensive from
the private perspective. If the private and social factor intensity rankings are the same, then
the dynamics of small open economy satisfies determinacy of equilibrium.
Intuitive implication of the above proposition is as follows. Suppose that the economy
initially stays at the steady-state equilibrium. As an example of expectation driven fluctu-
ations, assume that the agents anticipate an expansion of production of investment goods.
Then the price of investment goods (in terms of consumption goods), p, is expected to fall.
If the social technology of investment good sector is more capital intensive than that of con-
sumption good sector (∆s > 0), then the Stolper-Samuelson condition (equation (13)) states
that a decrease in the relative price is associated with an increase in the factor-price ratio,
ω (= w/r) . Therefore, if the private technology of investment good sector is also more capital
intensive (∆p > 0), then a rise in the factor price ratio depresses the supply of investment
goods: see (18) . Therefore, the initial expectation about an enhancement of investment good
demand cannot be self-fulfilled, implying that the equilibrium path is uniquely determined
and that extrinsic uncertainty cannot produce economic fluctuations. However, if ∆s > 0
and ∆p < 0, a fall in the investment good price lowers the factor price ratio and, hence, the
investment good production will increase: see again (18) . As a result, the initial expectations
can be self-fulfilled, which indicates that expectations-driven fluctuations may be observable.9
3 The World Economy
We now introduce a foreign country who has the same market structure as that of the home
country. We still assume that consumption goods are tradable but investment goods are
not traded. In addition, it is assumed that residents in each country cannot directly own
9Using the same type of production function, we may confirm that Proposition 1 also holds in a two-sector,
closed-economy model of exogenous growth with a linear utility function: see Benhabib et al. (2000). It can
be also shown that the same result holds for the two-sector endogenous growth model of closed economies
with physical and human capital: see Benhabib et al. (2000), Bond et al. (1996), Mino (2001) and Bond and
Driskill (2006). The mathematical structure of those models is essentially the same.
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capital stock in the other country. However, they can freely lend to and borrow from the
households in the other country by transacting in the international bond market. Since we
will assume that both home and foreign countries produce homogenous consumption goods,
the intratemporal trade of consumption goods means intertemporal lending and borrowing
between the two countries.
3.1 Equilibrium Conditions and the Dynamic System
The production technologies of the foreign country also have the same Cobb-Douglas forms
except for the total factor productivity:
y∗i = A
∗
i k
∗ai
i l
∗bi
i k¯
αi−ai
i l¯
βi−bi
i , i = 1, 2,
where star superscripts denote foreign variables. We also assume that the representative
household in the foreign country has the same preference structure as that of the households
in the home country. The foreign households maximize
U∗ =
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
c∗1−σ
1− σdt, σ > 0, ρ > 0
subject to the following constraints:
b˙∗ = Rb∗ + r∗k∗ + w∗ − c∗ − p∗v∗,
k˙∗ = v∗ − δk∗,
together with the initial conditions and the non-Ponzi-game condition.
Since the production structures are the same as those of home country (except for the
total factor productivity), the dynamic behaviors of k∗ and ω∗ (= w∗/r∗) are respectively
given by
k˙∗ = A∗1y
1 (k∗,ω∗)− δk∗, (23)
ω˙∗ = ω
∗
∆s
[A∗1r˜ (ω∗)−R− δ] , (24)
where the forms of yi (k∗,ω∗) (i = 1, 2) and rˆ (ω∗) functions are the same as those of the
home country.
To complete the two-country world model, we should endogenize the world interest rate,
R. Since the consumption good is tradeable, its world-wide market equilibrium condition is
c+ c∗ = y2 + y
∗
2. (25)
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Note that factor income distribution in the competitive equilibrium in each country means
that rk+w = py1 + y2 and r∗k∗ +w∗ = p∗y∗1 + y
∗
2. Therefore, the flow budget constraint for
the households in each country is respectively written as
b˙ = Rb+ y2 − c,
b˙∗ = Rb∗ + y∗2 − c∗,
each of which describes the current account in the home and foreign countries. The world
market equilibrium condition (25) yields the market clearing condition for the bond market:
b+ b∗ = 0. (26)
Condition (4) gives c = φ−1/σ. The shadow value of asset of the foreign country, φ∗, also
follows φ˙∗/φ∗ = ρ − R = φ˙/φ, which means that the relative value of φ∗/φ stays constant
over time. As a result, letting φ∗/φ = m and using (4) , we express the equilibrium condition
for consumption goods as:
φ−1/σ + (mφ)−1/σ = A2y2 (k,ω) +A∗2y2 (k∗,ω∗) . (27)
Keeping in mind that m is constant over time, we take the time derivative of both sides of
(27) to obtain:
1
σ
h
φ−1/σ + (mφ)−1/σ
i
(R− ρ)
= A2y
2
k (k,ω)
£
A1y
1 (k,ω)− δk
¤
+A2y
2
ω (k,ω) ω∆s [A1r˜ (ω)−R− δ]
+A∗2y
2
k∗ (k
∗,ω∗)
£
A∗1y
1 (k∗,ω∗)− δk∗
¤
+A2y
2
ω∗ (k
∗,ω∗) ω∗∆s [A
∗
1r˜ (ω∗)−R− δ] .
(28)
In deriving the above, we use (19) , (20) , (23) and (24) . Plugging (27) into the left-hand-side
of the above equation, we find that R depends on k, k∗, ω and ω∗. As we see in the next
subsection, in the steady state equilibrium of the world economy, the interest rate equals to
the time discount rate (R = ρ) . Out of the steady state, the above equation states that the
interest rate in the world financial market is expressed as a function of k,ω, k∗ and ω∗ :
R = R (k,ω, k∗,ω∗) . (29)
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It is to be noted that function R (.) does not contain m. We characterize this function in the
next subsection.
In sum, a complete dynamic system of the financially integrated world economy is given
by the following system:
k˙ = A1y
1 (k,ω)− δk, (30)
ω˙ = ω
∆s
[A1r˜ (ω)−R (k,ω, k∗,ω∗)− δ] , (31)
k˙∗ = A∗1y
1 (k∗,ω∗)− δk∗, (32)
ω˙∗ = ω
∗
∆s
[A∗1r˜ (ω∗)−R (k,ω, k∗,ω∗)− δ] . (33)
Note again that m (= φ∗/φ) stays constant over time and it does not directly affects the
dynamic behaviors of k, k∗,ω and ω∗. This means that the choice of m only affect the relative
consumption levels both in the transition and in the steady state.
3.2 The Steady-State Equilibrium
In the steady-state equilibrium, where k˙ = k˙∗ = ω˙ = ω˙∗ = 0, the following conditions are
satisfied:
A1y
1 (k,ω)− δk = 0,
A1r˜ (ω)−R (k,ω, k∗,ω∗)− δ = 0,
A∗1y
1 (k∗,ω∗)− δk∗ = 0,
A∗1r˜ (ω∗)−R (k,ω, k∗,ω∗)− δ = 0.
Notice that in the steady state (29) becomes
R = ρ, (34)
which pins down the long-run rate of world interest rate. As a result, the second and fourth
steady conditions shown above respectively become:
A1r˜ (ωˆ) = ρ+ δ, (35)
A∗1r˜ (ωˆ∗) = ρ+ δ, (36)
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where ωˆ and ωˆ∗ denote the steady-state values of factor price ratios. Since r˜ (.) function is
monotonically decreasing, (35) and (36) respectively determines unique levels of ω and ω∗
in the steady state. More specifically, the steady-sate values of factor price ratios in both
countries satisfy
ωˆ∗
ωˆ =
µ
A1
A∗1
¶1−α1
.
Once the steady-state values of ωˆ and ωˆ∗ are given, the long-run levels of capital, kˆ and kˆ∗,
are also uniquely determined by A1y1 (k,ω)− δk = 0 and A∗1y1 (k∗,ω∗)− δk∗ = 0. Thus we
obtain:
kˆ − (a2/b2) ωˆ
∆p
A1
µ
a1
b1
¶α1
ωˆα1−1 = δkˆ, (37)
kˆ∗ − (a2/b2) ωˆ∗
∆p
A∗1
µ
a1
b1
¶α1
ωˆ∗α1−1 = δkˆ∗. (38)
We assume that there exist feasible levels of kˆ and kˆ∗ that fulfill the two equations shown
above. Consequently, the steady-state values of the state variables of the world economy,³
kˆ, ωˆ, kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
, are uniquely given.10
Finally, the equilibrium level of the shadow value of asset in the home country determined
by ³
1 +m−1/σ
´
λˆ−1/σ = A2y2
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
+A∗2y
2
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
. (39)
where λˆ is the steady-state level of the implicit price of asset holding. Thus the long-run level
of consumption of each country respectively given by
cˆ = λˆ−1/σ, cˆ∗ =
³
mλˆ
´−1/σ
. (40)
It is worth noting that the steady-state levels of capital and factor price ratios are independent
of the choice of m, but the relative consumption levels of both countries in the steady state
depends on m. It is obvious that both countries have the identical technologies and thus
Ai = A
∗
i (i = 1, 2) , then it holds that kˆ = kˆ
∗ and ωˆ = ωˆ∗.
10 In view of (28) , we observe that the steady state conditions, k˙ = ω = k˙∗ = ω˙∗ = 0, guarantee that
R
?
kˆ, ωˆ, kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
?
= ρ holds as well.
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4 Equilibrium Determinacy of the World Economy
4.1 A Linearized System
In this section we analyze the world economy dynamics around the steady-state equilibrium.
Conducting a linear approximation of the dynamic system consisting of (30) , (31) , (32) and
(33) , we see that the coefficient matrix of the linearized system is given by
Js =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
A1y
1
k − δ A1y1ω 0 0
− ωˆ∆sRk
ωˆ
∆s (A1r˜
0 −Rω) − ωˆ∆sRk∗ −
ωˆ
∆sRω∗
0 0 A∗1y
1
k∗ − δ A∗1y1ω∗
− ωˆ∗∆sRk −
ωˆ∗
∆sRω −
ωˆ∗
∆sRk∗
ωˆ∗
∆s (A
∗
1r˜
0∗ −Rω∗)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (41)
where all the elements are evaluated at the steady state.11
The above matrix involves the partial derivatives of R (.) function evaluated at the steady
state. To inspect the sign of those partial derivatives, the following fact will be useful. First,
using the steady state conditions, we find:
Rk =
A2
Φ
y2k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´h
A1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ
i
, (42a)
Rω =
A1A2
Φ
∙
y2k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
y1ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
+
ωˆ
∆s
y2ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
r˜0(ωˆ)
¸
, (42b)
Rk∗ =
A∗2
Φ
y2k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´ h
A∗1y
1
k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
− δ
i
, (42c)
Rω∗ =
A∗1A
∗
2
Φ
∙
y2k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
y1ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
+
ωˆ∗
∆s
y2ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
r˜0 (ωˆ∗)
¸
, (42d)
where
Cˆ ≡ cˆ+ cˆ∗ > 0,
Φ ≡ 1σ Cˆ +
ωˆ
∆sA2y
2
ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
+ ωˆ
∗
∆sA
∗
2y
2
ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
.
Here, Cˆ is the world demand on the consumption good, while Φ represents the sensitivity
of excess demand for consumption goods with respective to a change in the nominal interest
rate, R. From the steady-state conditions and the sign conditions in (18) , we confirm the
following:
11Here, r˜0 = r˜0 (ωˆ) and r˜0∗ = r˜0 (ωˆ∗) .
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Lemma 1 (i) If ∆p∆s > 0, then Φ > 0, and (ii) if ∆p < 0 and ∆s > 0, then Φ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
The above lemma indicates the following facts about the signs of partial derivatives of
R (.) function:
sign Rk = sign Rk∗ = − sign Φ,
sign Rω = sign Rω∗ = sign Φ if ∆p∆s < 0.
(43)
These results will be useful for analyzing the stability condition shown in the next subsection.
4.2 Symmetric Steady State
We first focus on the symmetric steady state under the assumption that Ai = A∗i (i = 1, 2) . In
this case heterogeneity between the home and foreign countries is represented by differences
in the initial distributions of capital and asset holdings. Note again that the steady-state
values of capital stocks and the factor price ratios are respectively identical in both countries,
so that kˆ = kˆ∗ and ωˆ = ωˆ∗. This means that we can set y1k = y1k∗ , y1ω = y1ω∗ , r˜0 = r˜∗0 and
Rk
³
kˆ, ωˆ, kˆ, ωˆ
´
= Rk∗
³
kˆ, ωˆ, kˆ, ωˆ
´
,
Rω
³
kˆ, ωˆ, kˆ, ωˆ
´
= Rω∗
³
kˆ, ωˆ, kˆ, ωˆ
´
.
in matrix J displayed above.
Remember that (35) and (36) yield:
A1 y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
=
1
b1∆p
A1r˜ (ω) =
1
b1∆p
(ρ+ δ)
=
1
b1∆p
A∗1r˜ (ω∗) = A∗1y1k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
.
Similarly, it can be shown that
y1ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
= y1ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
.
Let us write the characteristic equation of the linearized as Ψs (λ) ≡ det [λI − J ] = 0. Then
by use of the symmetric property conditions, we verify that the characteristic equation of the
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coefficient matrix J can be expressed in the following manner:12
Ψs (λ) ≡ det
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ− λs1 −A1y1ω 0 0
ωˆ
∆sRk λ−
ωˆ
∆s (A1r˜
0 −Rω) ωˆ∆sRk
ωˆ
∆sRω
0 0 λ− λs1 −A1y1ω
ωˆ
∆sRk
ωˆ
∆sRω
ωˆ
∆sRk λ−
ωˆ
∆s (A1r˜
0 −Rω)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= (λ− λs1)2 (λ− λs2)2 = 0,
where
λs1 ≡ A1y1k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ = 1b1∆p (ρ+ δ)− δ,
λs2 ≡ ωˆ∆sA1r˜
0 (ωˆ) .
As a consequence, the linearized dynamic system evaluated at the symmetric steady state has
the same characteristic roots as those of the dynamic system that depicts the local behavior
of the corresponding small-open economy. To sum up, we have shown:
Proposition 2 In the symmetric steady state of the world economy, the equilibrium path
converging to the steady state is locally intermediate, if and only if the investment good sector
uses a more capital intensive technology than the consumption good sector from the social
perspective, while it uses a less capital intensive technology from the private perspective. Con-
versely, if the small open economy holds determinacy conditions, i.e. ∆s∆p > 0, then the
world economy is locally determinate as well.
It is worth pointing out that although in the symmetric steady state capital stocks as
well as factor price ratios are the same for both countries, it does not mean that neither
international trade nor financial interactions is taking place in the steady-state equilibrium.
To see this, suppose that at the outset households in each country have no foreign assets, that
is, b0 = b∗0 = 0. Then, due to the no-Ponzi-game conditions given by (3), the intertemporal
budget constraint for the home and foreign households are respectively given by the following:
k0 +
Z ∞
0
exp
µ
−
Z t
0
Rsds
¶
wtdt =
Z ∞
0
exp
µ
−
Z t
0
Rsds
¶
ctdt,
k∗0 +
Z ∞
0
exp
µ
−
Z t
0
Rsds
¶
w∗t dt =
Z ∞
0
exp
µ
−
Z t
0
Rsds
¶
c∗tdt.
12See Appendix 2.
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Hence, using c∗t = (m)
−1/σ ct, we obtain
m =
⎡
⎣
k0 +
R∞
0 exp
³
−
R t
0 Rsds
´
wtdt
k∗0 +
R∞
0 exp
³
−
R t
0 Rsds
´
w∗t dt
⎤
⎦
σ
. (44)
Remember that from (10) and (12) the real wage rates are determined by wt = a
α2
2 b
1−α2
2 ω
α2
t
and w∗t = a
α2
2 b
1−α2
2 ω
∗α2
t . If the steady state holds local determinacy, under a given set of
initial capital holdings, (k0, k∗0) , the paths of factor price ratios, {ωt,ω∗t }∞t=0, are uniquely
determined. This means that the value of m depends on the initial levels of capital stocks in
both countries.13
For example, assume that the utility functions are logarithmic so that σ = 1. Since in
the symmetric steady state both the home and foreign countries produce the same level of
consumption goods, (44) indicates that if m > 1 (so ct > c∗t for all t ≥ 0), then the home
country imports consumption goods from the foreign country, and hence its asset position is
negative in the steady state. The steady-state expressions of the flow budget constraints for
the households in both countries are:
bˆ =
1
ρ
h
cˆ− y2
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´i
< 0,
bˆ∗ =
1
ρ
∙
cˆ
m
− y2
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´¸
> 0.
Conversely, when m < 1, the home country is a creditor and the foreign country is a debtor
in the long-run equilibrium.
If ∆p < 0 and ∆s > 0 so that there is a continuum of converging paths towards the
symmetric steady state, then the initial levels of ω and ω∗ may not be uniquely deter-
mined under a given set of (k0, k∗0) . This means that the discounted sum of human wealth,R∞
0 exp
³
−
R t
0 Rsds
´
wt and
R∞
0 exp
³
−
R t
0 Rsds
´
w∗t dt cannot be uniquely given. Thus the
choice of m is also affected by expectations formation, which implies that the steady-state
levels of consumption and the asset position of each country also depends on expectations of
agents in the world economy. This also shows that even if the world economy converges to
the steady state, the long-term income distribution between the home and countries is not
uniquely determined either. Since the steady-state levels of per-capita income of the home
13 If b0 = −b∗0 6= 0, then the initial asset positions also affects the magnitude of m.
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and foreign countries are respectively given by
cˆ+ pˆvˆ = Rbˆ+ rˆkˆ + wˆ,
cˆ∗ + pˆ∗vˆ∗ = −Rbˆ+ rˆ∗kˆ∗ + wˆ∗.
Hence, noting that R = ρ = r/p− δ = rˆ/pˆ∗ − δ in the steady state, we see that the long-run
level of relative income between two countries is expressed as:
cˆ+ pˆvˆ
cˆ+ pˆvˆ
=
(ρ+ δ)pˆ∗ (ωˆ∗) kˆ + ρbˆ+ wˆ∗
³
kˆ∗
´
(ρ+ δ) pˆ (ω∗) kˆ − ρbˆ+ wˆ
³
kˆ
´ .
As noted above, while the steady-state values of ωˆ, ωˆ∗, kˆ and kˆ∗ are uniquely given, the
long-run level of asset position bˆ depends on expectations. Hence, the per-capita income of
each country may not converge to the same level in the long run, even if both countries are
endowed with the same production technologies and preferences.
4.3 Asymmetric Steady State
Next, we examine the case of asymmetric steady state with A1 6= A∗1 and A2 6= A∗2. In this
case, the coefficient matrix of the linearized dynamic system is given by
Ja =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
A1y
1
k − δ A1y1ω 0 0
− ωˆ∆sRk
ωˆ
∆s (A1r˜
0 −Rω) − ωˆ∆sRk∗ −
ωˆ
∆sRω∗
0 0 A∗1y
1
k∗ − δ A∗1y1ω∗
− ωˆ∗∆sRk −
ωˆ∗
∆sRω −
ωˆ∗
∆sRκ∗
ωˆ∗
∆s (A
∗
1r˜
∗0 −Rω∗)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
We see that from (35) and (36) the steady-state conditions yield:
A1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
=
A1
∆p
µ
a1
b1
¶α1
ωˆα1−1 = A1
b1∆p
r˜ (ω) = 1
b1∆p
(ρ+ δ) ,
A∗1y
1
k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
=
A∗1
∆p
µ
a1
b1
¶α1
ωˆ∗α1−1 = A
∗
1
b1∆p
r˜ (ω∗) = 1
b1∆p
(ρ+ δ) .
The above equations show that A1y1k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
= A∗1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
still holds even in the asymmetric
steady state. Similarly, it is also satisfied that
ωˆ
∆s
A1rˆ
0 (ωˆ) = (α1 − 1)
∆s
A1r˜ (ωˆ) =
(α1 − 1)(ρ+ δ)
∆s
,
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ωˆ∗
∆s
A∗1rˆ
0 (ωˆ∗) = (α1 − 1)
∆s
A∗1r˜ (ωˆ∗) =
(α1 − 1)(ρ+ δ)
∆s
.
Using these facts and denoting λs1 = A1y1k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ = 1b1∆p (ρ+ δ) − δ and λ
s
2 =
ωˆ
∆sA1rˆ
0 (ωˆ) , we can express the characteristic equation of Ja as follows:
Ψa (λ) = det
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ− λs1 −A1y1ω 0 0
ωˆ
∆sRk λ− λ
s
2 +
ωˆ
∆sRω
ωˆ
∆sRk∗
ωˆ
∆sRω∗
0 0 λ− λs1 −A∗1y1ω∗
ωˆ∗
∆sRk
ωˆ∗
∆sRω
ωˆ∗
∆sRk∗ λ− λ
s
2 +
ωˆ∗
∆sRω∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= 0.
In the above, we should note:
sign λs1 = sign ∆p,
sign λs2 = − sign ∆s.
(45)
As shown in Appendix 3, we can verify that
Ψa (λ) = (λ− λs1) (λ− λs2) η (λ) = 0,
where
η (λ) = λ2 +
h
ωˆ∗
∆s
¡
Rω∗ +
¡ ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¢
Rω
¢
− (λs1 + λs2)
i
λ+ λs1λs2
+ ωˆ∆s
£
A∗1y
1
ω∗Rk∗ +
ωˆ
ωˆ∗A1y
1
ωRk
¤
− λs1 ωˆ
∗
∆s
£
Rω∗ +
¡ ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¢
Rω
¤
.
(46)
Since λs1 and λs:2 are the characteristic roots for the model with symmetric steady state,
if the symmetric steady state is determinate, it holds that λs1λs2 < 0. In the case of indeter-
minate steady state, both λs1 and λs2 have negative real parts so that λs1λs2 > 0. Those facts
imply that the determinacy/intermediacy conditions depend on the signs of roots contained
in (46) . We have thus found:
Lemma 2 Suppose that the steady state of the small open economy exhibits local intermedi-
acy. Then the steady state of the world economy with heterogenous total factor productivities
is locally determinate if and only if η (λ) = 0 has two roots with positive real parts. Con-
versely, suppose that the steady state of the small country satisfies local determinacy. Then
the steady state of the world economy is locally indeterminate if η (λ) = 0 has two roots with
negative real part.
19
Let us denote the roots of (46) by λa1 and λa2. Then we obtain:
λa1 + λa2 = λs1 + λs2 −
ωˆ∗
∆s
µ
Rω∗ +
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶
Rω
¶
, (47)
λa1λa2 = λs1λs2 +
ωˆ
∆s
∙
A∗1y
1
ω∗Rk∗ +
ωˆ
ωˆ∗A1y
1
ωRk
¸
− λs1
ωˆ∗
∆s
∙
Rω∗ +
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶
Rω
¸
. (48)
Here, the following lemma is useful for the subsequent discussion:
Lemma 3 (i) If Φ > 0, then sign λa1 + λa2 < 0, and (ii) sign [λa1λa2] = sign [Φ] sign [λs1λs2].
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Relying on the results obtained so far, we find the following:
Proposition 3 Even if each country has different total factor productivities, the set of suf-
ficient conditions for determinacy (or indeterminacy) of the equilibrium path of the world
economy are the same as these for the case of small-open economy.
Proof. First, suppose that the small-open economy exhibits local indeterminacy so that
the symmetric world steady state is locally indeterminate as well. If this is the case, λs1 =
A1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ < 0 and λs2 = ωˆ∆sA1r˜
0 (ωˆ) < 0. Since the indeterminacy conditions for the
world economy with the symmetric steady state are ∆s > 0 and ∆p < 0, Lemma 3 (i) states
that if Φ > 0, then λa1 + λa2 < 0. Additionally, Lemma 3 (ii) shows that if Φ > 0, then
λa1λa2 > 0. In this case both λa1 and λa2 have negative real parts. As a result, all the roots of
Ψa (λ) = 0 have negative real parts. If Φ < 0, from (ii) of Lemma 3 λa1λa2 < 0, implying that
Ψa (λ) = 0 have one positive root and three roots with negative real parts. Hence, in view
of Lemma 2, the steady-state equilibrium is locally indeterminate, regardless of the sign of
Φ. Second, let us assume that the local behavior of small-open economy holds equilibrium
determinacy under ∆p∆s > 0. Since, as shown by Lemma 1, it holds that Φ > 0 in the case
of ∆p∆s > 0. Hence, by Lemma 3 (ii) we see that λa1λa2 < 0, so η (λ) = 0 has one negative
root, implying that the characteristic equation, Ψa (λ) = 0, has two stables roots. Thus the
world economy also holds local determinacy around the steady-state equilibrium.
This proposition demonstrates that if the home and foreign countries differ in their total
factor productivities as well as on asset and capital holdings, then the stability conditions
for the small-open economy model are still valid for the world economy model with two large
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countries. Only difference from the case of symmetric steady state is that the sable manifold
around the steady state would be three dimensional rather than four dimensional in the
asymmetric steady state that satisfy the indeterminacy conditions, i.e. ∆p > 0 and∆s < 0.14.
Therefore, dynamic behavior of each variables would be more restricted in the asymmetric
case than in the symmetric steady state, if the indeterminacy conditions hold. Otherwise, the
conditions for aggregate stability/instability of the world economy are essentially the same as
those for the small-open economy in our setting. In this sense, the relation between volatility
and financial integration is the same for a small county as well as for a large country.
4.4 Further Heterogeneity
In order to consider robustness of our results obtained so far, let us introduce further hetero-
geneity in each country. Assume that in addition to the difference in total factor productivity,
each county has different degree of external effects. Hence, the magnitudes of ai and bi are
the same for both countries, but the values of αi may be different from α∗i . In other words,
the private factor intensity ranking expressed by ∆p is common for both countries, while the
social factor intensity ranking in the foreign country, ∆∗s, is not equal to that of the home
country, ∆s. If this is the case, the coefficient matrix of the linearized dynamic system is
written as
Jaa =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
A1y
1
k − δ A1y1ω 0 0
− ωˆ∆sRk
ωˆ
∆s (A1r˜
0 −Rω) − ωˆ∆sRk∗ −
ωˆ
∆sRω∗
0 0 A∗1y
1
k∗ − δ A∗1y1ω∗
− ωˆ∗∆∗sRk −
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rω − ωˆ
∗
∆∗s
Rκ∗
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
(A∗1r˜
∗0 −Rω∗)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
where the magnitudes of Rω and Rω∗ also depend on a new parameter ∆∗s. Note that we have
assumed that ∆p = ∆∗p and thus
A1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ = 1
b1∆p
(ρ+ δ)− δ = A∗1y1k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
− δ.
14As mentioned in Proof for Proposition 2, the number of stable root is three if Φ < 0.
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As a result, the characteristic equation is expressed as
Ψaa (λ) = det
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ− λs1 −A1y1ω 0 0
ωˆ
∆sRk λ− λ
s
2 +
ωˆ
∆sRω
ωˆ
∆sRk∗
ωˆ
∆sRω∗
0 0 λ− λs1 −A∗1y1ω∗
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rk
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rω
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rk∗ λ− λ∗s2 + ωˆ
∗
∆∗s
Rω∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= 0.
Here, all the elements are evaluated at the asymmetric steady state. As before, λsi and
λs∗2 denote the characteristic roots for the dynamics if the home and foreign countries were
small-open economies. They are specified as
λs1 = A1y1k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ = 1
b1∆p
(ρ+ δ)− δ = λ∗s1 , (49)
λs2 =
ωˆ
∆s
A1r˜
0 (ωˆ) = (α1 − 1)
∆s
A1r˜
0 (ωˆ) = (α1 − 1)(ρ+ δ)
∆s
, (50)
λ∗s2 =
ωˆ∗
∆s
A∗1r˜
0 (ωˆ∗) = (α1 − 1)
∆∗s
A∗1r˜
0 (ωˆ∗) = (α1 − 1)(ρ+ δ)
∆∗s
. (51)
The partial derivatives of R (.) function are now replaced with:
Rk =
A2
Φa
y2k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´ h
A1y
1
k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
− δ
i
=
A2
Φa
y2k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
λs1, (52a)
Rω =
A1A2
Φa
∙
y2k
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
y1ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
+
ωˆ
∆s
y2ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
r˜0(ωˆ)
¸
, (52b)
Rk∗ =
A∗2
Φa
y2k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´ h
A∗1y
1
k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
− δ
i
=
A∗2
Φa
y2k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
λs1, (52c)
Rω∗ =
A∗1A
∗
2
Φa
∙
y2k∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
y1ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
+
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
y2ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
r˜0 (ωˆ∗)
¸
, (52d)
where
Cˆ ≡ cˆ+ cˆ∗ > 0,
Φa ≡ 1σ Cˆ +
ωˆ
∆sA2y
2
ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
+ ωˆ
∗
∆∗s
A∗2y
2
ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
.
Notice that since α1 6= α∗1, it does not hold that A1rˆ0 (ωˆ) = A∗1rˆ0 (ωˆ∗) .
It is easy to see that the characteristic equation of Jaa is rewritten as
Ψaa (λ) = (λ− λs1) ξ (λ) = 0,
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where
ξ (λ) ≡ (λ− λs2)A1y1ω
ωˆ
∆s
Rk∗ + (λ− λs1) (λ− λ∗s2 )
ωˆ
∆s
Rω
+(λ− λs1)A∗1y1ω∗
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rk∗ + (λ− λs1) (λ− λs2)
∙
λ− λs∗2 +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rω∗
¸
.
This equation is re-expressed as
ξ (λ) ≡ λ3 + ψ2λ2 + ψ1λ+ ψ0, (53)
where
ψ2 = − (λs1 + λs2 + λs∗2 ) +
ωˆ
∆s
Rω +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rω∗ ,
ψ1 = λs1λs2 + λs1λs∗2 + λs2λs∗2 −
∙
ωˆ
∆s
λs2Rω +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
λs∗2 Rω∗
¸
−
∙
ωˆ
∆s
(A1y
1
ωRk − λs1Rω) +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
(A∗1y
1
ω∗Rk∗ − λs1Rω∗)
¸
,
ψ0 = −λs1λs2λs∗2 −
∙
ωˆ
∆s
λs∗2 (A1y1ωRk − λs1Rω) +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
λs2(A∗1y1ω∗Rk∗ − λs1Rω∗)
¸
.
Thus letting λaai (i = 1, 2, 3) be the roots of ξ (λ) = 0, we obtain the following relations:
λaa1 + λaa2 + λaa3 = λs1 + λs2 + λs∗2 −
µ
ωˆ
∆s
Rω +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rω∗
¶
, (54)
λaa1 λaa2 + λaa2 λaa3 + λaa3 λaa1 = λs1λs2 + λs1λs∗2 + λs2λs∗2 −
∙
ωˆ
∆s
λs2Rω +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
λs∗2 Rω∗
¸
+
∙
ωˆ
∆s
(A1y
1
ωRk − λs1Rω) +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
(A∗1y
1
ω∗Rk∗ − λs1Rω∗)
¸
,(55)
λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 = λs1λs2λs∗2 +
∙
ωˆ
∆s
λs∗2 (A1y1ωRk − λs1Rω) +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
λs2(A∗1y1ω∗Rk∗ − λs1Rω∗)
¸
. (56)
Notice that since the sign conditions for yik and y
i
ω (i = 1, 2) depend only on the sign of
∆p
¡
= ∆∗p
¢
, the signs of Rj (j = k,ω, k∗,ω∗) are the same as before if ∆s and ∆∗s have the
same sign.
For inspecting the characteristic roots of ξ (λ) = 0, it is useful to notice the following:
Lemma 4 (i) If ∆p∆s > 0 and ∆p∆∗s > 0, then Φa > 0, and: (ii) if ∆p < 0, ∆s > 0,
∆∗s > 0, then Φa < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
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Lemma 5 It holds that
sign λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 = sign λs1λs2λs∗2 if Φa > 0,
sign λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 = −sign λs1λs2λs∗2 if Φa < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Lemmas 4 and 5 immediately yield the following outcome:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the home and foreign countries have different degrees of exter-
nal effects in production. Then (i) if both home and foreign countries hold indeterminacy
conditions for the case of small-open economy, the steady state of the world economy cannot
be determinate, and; (ii) if both counties hold determinacy of equilibrium as small countries,
the steady state of the world economy can be indeterminate.
Proof. First, assume that both countries satisfy local indeterminacy condition in the
case of small country model, so that ∆p
¡
= ∆∗p
¢
< 0, ∆s > 0 and ∆∗s > 0. Given those
conditions, (ii) in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 show that λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 > 0 because λs1 < 0, λs2 < 0
and λs∗2 < 0. This means that either ξ (λ) = 0 have two roots with negative real parts and
one negative root or it has three roots with positive real parts. The former means that
Ψaa (λ) = (λ− λs1) ξ (λ) = 0 has three stable roots, while the later shows that it has three
unstable roots. Therefore, when each country exhibits indeterminacy as a small country, the
world economy cannot establish equilibrium determinacy around the steady state. Conversely,
if each country satisfies the determinacy condition, i.e. ∆p∆s > 0 and ∆p∆∗s > 0, then (i) in
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 states that λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 < 0. Thus ξ (λ) = 0 has three stable roots or it
has one stable and two unstable roots. Therefore, if the former case holds, the steady-state
equilibrium of the world economy is indeterminate.
The first part of Proposition 4 demonstrates that the local indeterminacy condition for a
small country is still valid for the two-large country world, even though the forms of social
production functions are different from each other in home and foreign countries. This result
does not exclude the possibility that the steady state of the world economy is unstable, that
is, λaa1 > 0, λaa2 >, and λaa3 > 0, so that there is only one stable root, λs1. Such a conclusion
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does not hold if
λaa1 + λaa2 + λaa3 = λs1 + λs2 + λs∗2 −
µ
ωˆ
∆s
Rω +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rω∗
¶
< 0.
We can confirm that if ∆p < 0, ∆s > 0 and ∆∗s > 0, then Rω +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
Rω∗ < 0.15 Note that
λs1 + λs2 + λs∗2
=
ρ+ δ
b1∆p
− δ + (α1 − 1)(ρ+ δ)
∆s
+
(α1 − 1)(ρ+ δ)
∆∗s
. (57)
Consequently, when the absolute values of stable roots, λs1, λs2 and λs∗2 are sufficiently large,
the above inequality can be satisfied. If this is the case Ψaa (λ) = 0 has three stable roots so
that the steady-state equilibrium of the world economy is not totally unstable in the sense
that we can always find a converging path near the steady.
The second part of Proposition 4 indicates that even though both countries have the
same factor-intensity rankings from the private as well as social perspectives, the financially
integrated world could exhibit local indeterminacy. To derive a sufficient condition for this
conclusion, let us assume that ∆p < 0, ∆s < 0 and ∆∗s < 0. Now consider the following
sequence:
1, ψ2, ψ1 −
ψ0
ψ2
, ψ0.
The Routh theorem states that if the above sequence does not change signs, i.e. ψ2 >
0, ψ1 − ψ0/ψ2 > 0 and ψ0 > 0, then ξ (λ) = 0 has no root with positive real part, which
means that all the characteristic roots of Ψaa (λ) = 0 are stable ones. Since we find that
our specification of the factor ranking conditions cannot exclude this possibility, the financial
integration may enhance aggregate instability.
Finally, assume that the home country holds indeterminacy conditions, while the steady
state of the foreign country is locally determinate, that is, ∆p
¡
= ∆∗p
¢
< 0, ∆s > 0 and
∆∗s < 0. Inspecting the roots of ξ (λ) = 0, we find that it is now both of the following could
hold:
λaa1 + λaa2 + λaa3 > 0 and λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 < 0,
λaa1 + λaa2 + λaa3 < 0 and λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 > 0.
15See proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix 5.
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In the former, ξ (λ) = 0 involves one negative root and two roots with positive real parts,
which shows that the characteristic equation has two roots with negative real parts. If the
latter set of inequalities are satisfied, then ξ (λ) = 0 has one positive and three roots with
negative real parts. As a consequence, the steady state of the world economy is either locally
determinate or indeterminate, depending on the parameter magnitudes involved in the model.
This finding implies that volatility of one country may rely on whether it participates
the international financial market as a small country or as a large country. More specifi-
cally, when a country that satisfies local determinacy condition opens up international trade,
volatility may not be enhanced if that country is small enough not to affect the world interest
rate. However, if the country is large enough to affect the world interest rate, then financial
integration may destabilize the economy depending on the factor-ranking conditions of the
foreign countries.
5 Remarks
In this section, we make two remarks on our central findings in the previous section.
5.1 Reinterpretation of the World Economy Model
So far, we have mainly focused on the comparison of equilibrium determinacy conditions for
the world economy consisting of two large countries with those for a small-open economy.
In what follows, let us briefly consider the differences between the world economy model
and a model of single country. Since the world economy is a closed economy with multiple
countries, it would be insightful to examine the similarity and difference between the global
economy model and a model of closed single country. To see this, it is convenient to restate
the market equilibrium in terms of a pseudo-planning program in which planner maximizes
the representative families welfare subject to the resource constraints without internalizing
external effects of production.
When we treat a single country model, the optimization problem for the planner may be
expressed in the following manner:
max
v,s
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
h
A2 ((1− v) k)α2 (1− s)b2 X¯2
i1−σ
1− σ dt
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subject to
k˙ = A1 (vk)
a1 (s)b1 X¯1 − δk,
0 ≤ v, s ≤ 1,
k0 = given.
In the above, external effects are represented by
X¯1 =
¡
vk
¢α1−a1
(s¯)1−α1−b1 , X¯2 =
³
(1− v) k
´α2−a2 ¡
1− s
¢1−α2−b2 (58)
In this problem the control variables are the factor allocation rates, v and s. In this envi-
ronment, the planner solves the problem under given expected sequences of external effects,©
X¯1t, X¯2t
ª∞
t=0
. It is easy to see that unless σ = 0, so that the instantaneous utility function
is linear in consumption, the indeterminacy condition for the small-open economy is neither
necessary nor sufficient for equilibrium indeterminacy for the closed economy. When the
instantaneous felicity is linear in consumption so that intertemporal consumption smoothing
is perfect, the production possibility frontier between consumption and investment is linear
as well. Therefore, the optimal allocation of production factors between the investment and
consumption good sectors is determined by the production technology alone in the presence
of social constant returns to scale.16 In this case the determinacy/indeterminacy conditions
are thus the same as those for the small-open economy.
In the world-economy model, a pseudo-planning problem whose solution mimics the mar-
ket equilibrium can be set as
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
µ
μc
1−σ − 1
1− σ + μ
∗ c
∗1−σ − 1
1− σ
¶
dt
subject to
k˙ = A1 (vk)
a1 (s)b1 X¯1 − δk,
16 If σ = 0, the Hamiltonian function for the planner’s optimization problem is
Hp = A2 ((1− v) k)α2 (1− s)b2 X¯2 + p
?
A1 (vk)
a1 (s)b1 X¯1 − δk
?
= c+ pk˙,
where p denotes the shadow value of capital. Thus the optimal selections of v and s simply means maximization
of current level of national income (in terms of the consumption goods).
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k˙∗ = A∗1 (v
∗k∗)a
∗
1 (s∗)b
∗
1 X¯∗1 − δk∗,
c+ c∗ = A2 ((1− v) k)a2 (1− s)b2 X¯2 +A∗2 ((1− v∗) k∗)a2 (1− s∗)b2 X¯∗2 ,
together with the given initial stocks of capital, k0 and k∗0. Here, X¯1 and X¯2 are defined by
(58) and the external effects in the foreign country are:
X¯∗1 =
¡
v∗k∗
¢α∗1−a1 (s¯∗)1−α∗1−b1 , X¯∗2 = ³(1− v∗) k∗´α∗2−a2 ¡1− s∗¢1−α∗2−b2 .
In this problem the control variables for the planner are v, s, c, v∗, s∗ and c∗. Setting up the
Hamiltonian function such that
Hw = μ
c1−σ − 1
1− σ + μ
∗ c
∗1−σ − 1
1− σ
+ψ
h
A1 (vk)
a1 (s)b1 X¯1 − δk
i
+ ψ∗
h
A∗1 (v
∗k∗)a
∗
1 (s∗)b
∗
1 X¯∗1 − δk∗
i
+ξ
h
A2 ((1− v) k)a2 (1− s)b2 X¯2 +A∗2 ((1− v∗) k∗)a2 (1− s∗)b2 X¯∗2 − c− c∗
i
.
We can confirm that if we set ξ/ψ = p, ξ/ψ∗ = p∗ and μ∗/μ = φ∗/φ = m, then the first-
order conditions for this planning problem are identical to the equilibrium conditions for the
decentralized economy examined in the previous section. Additionally, it can be shown that
the no-Ponzi game conditions (3) corresponds to the transversality conditions for the above
problem.
With regard to selecting the optimal level of consumption, the key difference between the
closed economy model and the world economy setting is that the choice of factor allocation, v,
v∗, s and s∗, does not directly restrict the optimal level of consumption in the global economy.
In other words, while the total consumption, c + c∗, is determined by the world supply of
consumption goods, y2 + y∗2, the intratemporal allocation of labor and capital between the
two production sectors in each country is not directly restricted by the preference structure.
As a result, although the world economy is a closed economy, its dynamic behavior is not
diverge from that of a single, closed economy.
5.2 Alternative Trade Structure
Following the foregoing literature, we have assumed that investment goods are not interna-
tionally traded. To see how essential this assumption is, consider an alternative trade regime
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in which consumption goods are non-tradables, while investment goods are freely traded.
We assume that both countries produce a homogenous investment good. In this setting, the
optimization behavior of the representative family in the home country is given by
max
v,s
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
h
A2 ((1− v) k)b2 (1− s)b2 X¯2
i1−σ
1− σ dt
subject to
b˙ = Rb+A1 (vk)
a1 (s)b1 X¯1 − v,
k˙ = v − δk,
with given k0, b0 and
©
X¯1t, X¯2t,
ª∞
t=0
. It is to be noted that the indeterminacy conditions
used so far (∆p < 0 and ∆s > 0) are not effective for this open-economy model unless σ = 0.
When consumption goods are not traded, the corresponding pseudo-planning problem for
the world economy may be set as follows:
max
Z ∞
0
e−ρt
⎛
⎜⎝μ
h
A2 (v2k)
a2 (1− s)b2 X¯2
i1−σ
1− σ + μ
∗
h
A∗2 (v
∗
2k)
a2 (1− s∗)b2 X∗2
i1−σ
1− σ
⎞
⎟⎠ dt
subject to
k˙ = A1 (v1k)
a1 sb1X¯1 +A
∗
1 (v
∗
1k)
a1 s∗b1X∗1 ,
v1 + v2 + v
∗
1 + v
∗
2 = 1,
vi, v
∗
i , s, s
∗ ∈ [0, 1] , i = 1, 2.
together with the given expected sequences of external effects,
©
X¯1t, X¯2t, X¯
∗
1t, X¯
∗
2t
ª∞
t=0
and
the initial level of capital stock in the world, k0. In this problem, the control variables are
factor allocation rates, vi, v∗i , s, s
∗. Since the capital goods are traded, the aggregate capital
stock in the world is intrateporally allocated across the production sectors in both countries.
Again, the optimal allocation of production factors directly affects the level of felicity of
the planner. Hence, unless σ = 0, the indeterminacy conditions in our model may not be
applicable for the global economy model with non-traded consumption goods.
Although our model and the model discussed in this subsection impose extreme assump-
tions on trade structure, they demonstrate that the relation financial integration and aggre-
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gate stability would be sensitive not only to production technologies and preference structure
but also to trade patterns of commodities.17
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined equilibrium determinacy of the financially integrated two-country
world with sector as well as country-specific production externalities. Following the foregoing
studies, we have assumed that technology of each productions sector satisfies social constant
returns to scale, while the private technology exhibits decreasing returns. Our main finding
is that the stability conditions for the small-open economy model are valid in the general
equilibrium model of world economy as well, if the fundamentals of both countries are close
to each other. In particular, we have confirmed that if two counties are symmetric in the
sense that they have the same technology and preference structures, then the conditions for
equilibrium determinacy are exactly the same as those for the case of small open economy.
When each country has a specific value of total factor productivity so that the steady state
equilibrium is not symmetric for each country, the stability conditions mentioned above still
produce the same conclusion in the case of world economy. If the two countries have different
levels of external effects or if capital depreciation rates are not the same for both countries,
then determinacy conditions for the world economy may diverge from those established in
the small-open economy. Our study has demonstrated that heterogeneity of economies would
be a relevant determinant of uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibrium.
This paper has treated a two country, two-sector neoclassical growth model with social
constant returns and perfect international financial market. We have restricted our attention
to the presence of heterogeneity between two countries generated by differences in asset
holdings and production technologies. Other factors of heterogeneity such as differences in
preferences and policy parameters may produce alternative conclusions about stability.18 The
17Mino (2007) and (2008) examine equilibrium determinacy of two-country models in which there are ag-
gregate increasing returns to scale in production sectors and endogenous labor-leisure choice. The main focus
of those studies is to show how the preference structure affects equilibrium determinacy of the world economy
with international lending and borrowing. With regard to alternative formulation of macroeconomic open
economy models, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2002).
18Bosi and Seemuller (2008), Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2005) and Ghiglino (2007) investigate the role
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results may be also affected if endogenous growth is possible (as assumed by the two-country
model studied by Famer and Lahiri 2006). In addition, if the international financial market
is incomplete, we may obtain different outcomes.19 Considering our toping in those more
general environments may deserve further investigation.
Appendices
Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1:
(i) From (18), we know sign[y2ω] =sign[∆p]. Similarly, sign[y
2
ω∗ ] =sign[∆p] can be derived.
Hence Φ > 0 must be the case when ∆p∆s > 0.
(ii) Using the world-wide market-clearing condition in (25), we can rearrange Φ as
Φ =
∙
1
σA2y
2 (k,ω) + ω
∆s
A2y
2
ω (k,ω)
¸
+
∙
1
σA
∗
2y
2 (k∗,ω∗) + ω
∗
∆s
A∗2y
2
ω (k
∗,ω∗)
¸
Notice that, from (17c)
y2ω (k,ω) =
1
ω
µ
A1
A2
¶
p(ω)rˆ(ω)
b1b2∆p
[α2a1ω + (1− α2)b1k] .
Therefore, we obtain:
∙
1
σA2y
2 (k,ω) + ω
∆s
A2y
2
ω (k,ω)
¸
=
A1p(ω)rˆ(ω)
b1b2∆p
∙µ
α2
∆s
+
1
σ
¶
a1ω +
µ
1
∆s
− α2
∆s
− 1σ
¶
b1k
¸
.
If ∆p < 0 and ∆s > 0, then a sufficient condition for Φ < 0 is 1∆s −
α2
∆s −
1
σ > 0, that is,
σ > ∆s/(1− α2).
Appendix 2. Derivation of Ψs (λ) :
We find that the characteristic equation, Ψs (λ) = 0, can be exoressed in the following
manner:
of heterogenous preferences in equilibrium determinacy issue in closed economy models.
19 In the standard real business cycle literature assuming the presence of technological disturbances, Baxter
and Cucini (1995) and Heathcote and Perri (2002) reveal that the financial market structure may play a
pivotal role in determining international business cycles.
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Ψs (λ) = det
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ− (A1y1k − δ) −A1y1ω 0 0
0 λ− ωˆ∆sA1rˆ
0 0 λ− ωˆ∆sA1rˆ
0
0 0 λ− (A1y1k − δ) −A1y1ω
ωˆ
∆sR1
ωˆ
∆sR2
ωˆ
∆sR1 λ−
ωˆ
∆s (A1rˆ −R2)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
µ
λ− ωˆ
∆s
A1rˆ
¶
[λ− (A1y1k − δ)]
∙
−A1y1ω
ωˆ
∆s
R1 −
ωˆ
∆s
R2
¡
λ− (A1y1k − δ)
¢¸
+A1y
1
ω
£
λ− (A1y1k − δ)
¤ ∙
λ− ωˆ
∆s
A1rˆ
0
¸
ωˆ
∆s
R1
+
∙
λ− ωˆ
∆s
(A1rˆ −R2)
¸ £
λ− (A1y1k − δ)
¤ ∙
λ− ωˆ
∆s
A1rˆ
0
¸ £
λ− (A1y1k − δ)
¤
=
µ
λ− ωˆ
∆s
A1rˆ
0
¶
[λ− (A1y1k − δ)]χ (λ) ,
where
χ (λ) = −A1y1ω
ωˆ
∆s
R1 −
ωˆ
∆s
R2
¡
λ− (A1y1k − δ)
¢
+A1y
1
ω
ωˆ
∆s
R1
+
∙
λ− ωˆ
∆s
¡
A1rˆ
0 −R2
¢¸ £
λ− (A1y1k − δ)
¤
=
£
λ− (A1y1k − δ)
¤ ∙
λ− ωˆ
∆s
A1rˆ
0
¸
.
Consequently, we obtain:
Ψs (λ) =
µ
λ− ωˆ
∆s
A1rˆ
0
¶2
[λ− (A1y1k − δ)]2 = 0.
Appendix 3. Derivation of Ψa (λ) :
The characteristic equation, Ψa (λ) = 0, can be derived in the follwoing way:
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Ψa (λ) = det
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ− λs1 −A1y1ω 0 0
0 λ− λs2 0 − ωˆωˆ∗ (λ− λ
s
2)
0 0 λ− λs1 −A∗1y1ω∗
ωˆ∗
∆sRk
ωˆ∗
∆sRω
ωˆ∗
∆sRk∗ λ− λ
s
2 +
ωˆ∗
∆sRω∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
ωˆ
ωˆ∗ (λ− λ
s
2) (λ− λs1)A1y1ω
ωˆ
∆s
R1 +
ωˆ
ωˆ∗ (λ− λ
s
1)
2 (λ− λs2)
ωˆ
∆s
Rω
+A∗1y
1
ω∗
ωˆ∗
∆s
Rk∗ (λ− λs1) (λ− λs2) +
∙
λ− λs2 +
ωˆ∗
∆s
Rω∗
¸
(λ− λs1)2 (λ− λs2)
= (λ− λs1) (λ− λs2)φ(λ),
where
φ (λ) = λ2 +
"
ωˆ∗
∆s
Ã
Rω∗ +
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶2
Rω
!
− (λs1 + λs2)
#
λ+ λs1λs2
+
ωˆ∗
∆s
∙
A∗1y
1
ω∗Rk∗ +
ωˆ
ωˆ∗A1y
1
ωRk
¸
− λs1
ωˆ∗
∆s
"
Rω∗ +
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶2
Rω
#
.
Appendix 4. Proof of Lemma 3.
Using (52a) , (52b) , (52c) and (52d) ,we obtain the following:
λa1λa2 = λs1λs2 +
ωˆ∗
∆s
∙
A∗1y
1
ω∗Rk∗ +
ωˆ
ωˆ∗A1y
1
ωRk
¸
− λs1
ωˆ∗
∆s
"
Rω∗ +
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶2
Rω
#
= λs1λs2 +
ωˆ∗
∆s
A∗1
Φ
y1ω∗A
∗
2y
2
k∗ kˆ
∗, ωˆ∗
£
A∗1y
1
k∗ − δ
¤
+
ωˆ
∆s
1
Φ
A1y
1
ωA2y
2
k
£
A1y
1
k − δ
¤
−λs1
ωˆ∗
∆s
A∗1A
∗
2
Φ
∙
y2k∗y
1
ω∗ +
1
∆s
y2ω∗ rˆ
0
¸
− λs1
ωˆ∗
∆s
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶
A1A2
Φ
∙
y2ky
1
ω +
1
∆s
y2ωrˆ
0∗
¸
= λs1λs2
1
Φ
∙
Φ− ω
∆s
A2y
2
ω −
ω∗
∆s
A2y
2
ω∗
¸
= λs1λs2
Cˆ
σΦ .
Therefore, λa1λa2 has the same sign as that of λs1λs2, if and only if Φ > 0. We also find:
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λa1 + λa2 = (λs1 + λs2)−
ωˆ∗
∆s
∙
Rω∗ +
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶
Rω
¸
= (λs1 + λs2)
1
Φ
∙
σ−1Cˆ + ω
∆s
A2y
2
ω +
ω∗
∆s
A2y
2
ω∗
¸
− ωˆ
∗
∆s
A∗1A
∗
2
Φ
∙
y2k∗y
1
ω∗ +
1
∆s
y2ω∗ rˆ
0∗
¸
− ωˆ
∗
∆s
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶
A1A2
Φ
∙
y2ky
1
ω +
1
∆s
y2ω rˆ
0
¸
=
1
Φ
∙
λs1Φ+ λs2σ−1Cˆ −
ωˆ∗
∆s
A∗1A
∗
2y
2
k∗y
1
ω∗
¸
− ωˆ
∗
∆s
µ
ωˆ
ωˆ∗
¶
A1A2
Φ
y2ky
1
ω.
The above relation shows that λa1 + λa2 < 0 if Φ > 0.
Appendix 5: Proof of Lemma 4
From (15a) , (15b) and (25) we obtain:
Φa =
1
σ Cˆ +
ωˆ
∆s
A2y
2
ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
+
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
A∗2y
2
ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
=
1
σ
h
A2y
2
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
+A∗2y
2
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´i
+
ωˆ
∆s
A2y
2
ω
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
+
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
A∗2y
2
ω∗
³
kˆ∗, ωˆ∗
´
=
1
σ
a1ωˆ − b1kˆ
b1b2∆p
A1p (ω) r˜ (ω) +
1
σ
a1ωˆ∗ − b1kˆ∗
b1b2∆p
A∗1p (ωˆ∗) r˜ (ωˆ∗)
+
ωˆ
∆s
A1p (ω)
r˜ (ω)
ω
Ã
α2a1ωˆ + (1− α2) b1kˆ
b1b2∆p
!
+
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
A∗1p (ωˆ∗)
r˜ (ωˆ∗)
ωˆ∗
Ã
α∗2a1ωˆ∗ + (1− α∗2) b1kˆ∗
b1b2∆p
!
=
A1p (ωˆ) r˜ (ωˆ)
b1b2∆p
∙
1
σ
³
a1ωˆ − b1kˆ
´
+
1
∆s
³
α2a1ωˆ + (1− α2) b1kˆ
´¸
+
A1p (ωˆ∗) r˜ (ωˆ∗)
b1b2∆p
∙
1
σ
³
a1ωˆ∗ − b1kˆ∗
´
+
1
∆∗s
³
α∗2a1ωˆ∗ + (1− α∗2) b1kˆ∗
´¸
.
Note that a1ωˆ − b1kˆ = b1∆py2
³
kˆ, ωˆ
´
and a1ωˆ∗ − b1kˆ∗ = b1∆py2
³
ωˆ∗, kˆ∗
´
. Therefore, if
∆p∆s > 0 and ∆p∆∗s > 0, then Φa > 0. When ∆p < 0, ∆s > 0 and ∆
∗
s > 0, we see that
Φa < 0 if (1− α2) b1 − b1/σ > 0 and (1− α∗2) b1 − b1/σ > 0.
Appendix 6: Proof of Lemma 5
By use of the definition of Φa, λs2 = ωˆ∆sA1r˜
0 (ωˆ) and λs∗2 = ωˆ
∗
∆∗s
A∗1r˜
0 (ωˆ∗) , we can conduct
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the following manipulation:
λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 = −ψ0 = λs1λs2λs∗2 −
∙
ωˆ
∆s
λs∗2 (A1y1ωRk − λs1Rω) +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
λs2(A∗1y1ω∗Rk∗ − λs1Rω∗)
¸
= λs1λs2λs∗2
1
Φa
∙
1
σ Cˆ +
ωˆ
∆s
A2y
2
ω +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
A∗2y
2
ω∗
¸
+λs∗2 A1A2y1ωy2kλs1
ωˆ
∆s
1
Φa
+ λs2A∗1A∗2y1ωy2kλs1
ωˆ
∆s
1
Φa
−λs1λs2A1A2
ωˆ
∆s
1
Φa
∙
y2ky
1
ω +
ωˆ
∆s
y2ω r˜
0
¸
−λs1λ∗s2 A∗1A∗2
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
1
Φa
∙
y2k∗y
1
ω∗ +
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
y2ω∗ r˜
0∗
¸
= λs1λs2λs
∗
2
Cˆ
σΦa
+
1
Φa
ωˆ
∆s
λs1λ∗s2 A1A2y1ωy2k +
1
Φa
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
λs1λ∗s2 A1A2y1ωy2k
− 1
Φa
ωˆ
∆s
λs1λ∗s2 A1A2y1ωy2k −
1
Φa
ωˆ∗
∆∗s
λs1λ∗s2 A1A2y1ωy2k
= λs1λs2λs
∗
2
Cˆ
σΦa
.
Hence, we find that sign (λaa1 λaa2 λaa3 )×
³
λs1λs2λs
∗
2
´
= sign Φa.
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